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Abstract
Reductionist  realist  accounts  of  certain  entities,  such  as  the  natural  numbers  and
propositions, have been taken to be fatally undermined by what we may call the problem
of arbitrary identification. The problem is that there are multiple and equally adequate
reductions of the natural numbers to sets (see Benacerraf 1965), as well as of propositions
to unstructured or structured entities (see e.g. Bealer 1998 Melia 1992, King, Soames and
Speaks 2014). This paper sets out to solve the problem by canvassing what we may call
the arbitrary reference strategy. The main claims of such strategy are two. First: we do
not know which objects are the referents of proposition and numerical terms since their
reference is fixed arbitrarily. Secondly: our ignorance of which object is picked out as the
referent does not entail that no object is referred to by the relevant expression. Different
articulations of the strategy are assessed, and a new one is defended.
1 The problem of arbitrary identification for reductionist realisms 
Some of the reductionist realist accounts of certain entities advanced in contemporary
analytic philosophy seem to be affected by structurally similar problems, chief among
them the problem of arbitrary identification. The problem gets off the ground when you:
(i) Specify  the  reductive  framework within  which  the  reduction  should  take
place.
(ii) Ensure multiplicity, viz. make sure that there exists more than one candidate
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reduction.
(iii) Ensure  equal  adequacy,  viz.  make  sure  that  all  candidate  reductions  are
equally adequate.
In his 1965 seminal article ‘What numbers could not be’, Paul Benacerraf shows how
conditions (i)-(iii) can be satisfied by focusing on set-theoretic reductionist accounts of
the natural numbers.
Let  us begin with taking set  theory to be the target  reductive framework.  Benacerraf
claims  that  in  order  for  any  account  of  the  natural  numbers  (no  matter  whether
reductionist or non-reductionist in kind) to be adequate, two requirements must be met:
- The  account  should  provide  a  model  of  the  Dedekind-Peano  axioms,  thereby
entailing the truth of the standard theorems of arithmetic.
- The account should explain cardinality in terms of counting. 
These two requirements constitute what I shall call the  arithmetic adequacy constraint.
Benacerraf shows that there exists more than one arithmetically adequate set-theoretic
reduction  by  focusing  on  two  ways  of  stating  the  recursive  clause  ordering  the  set-
theoretic progression due to von Neumann and Zermelo. According to von Neumann’s
clause, the successor of a set s is the union s ∪ {s}. By contrast, according to Zermelo’s,
the successor of a set s is the singleton {s}. Since both progressions satisfy the arithmetic
adequacy  constraint,  there  are  multiple  and  equally  set-theoretical  reductions  of  the
natural numbers to sets. Thus, Benacerraf contends that there is no non-arbitrary reason
that enables us to establish which ω-sequence is the natural numbers. This is, in kernel
form, the problem of arbitrary identification for set-theoretic reductionist realism about
arithmetic.
In this paper, I set out to solve the problem of arbitrary identification by canvassing what
I shall call the  arbitrary reference strategy. The main claims of such strategy are two.
First: we do not know which objects are the referents of proposition and numerical terms
since  their  reference  is  fixed  arbitrarily.  Secondly:  our  ignorance  of  which  object  is
picked out as the referent does not entail  that no object is referred to by the relevant
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expression.
Before articulating the arbitrary reference strategy, a few preliminaries are in order. First,
I shall explain how the same problem can be raised against another central reductionist
enterprise in analytic philosophy: that of explaining what propositions are. Secondly, I
shall motivate the project of solving the problem of arbitrary identification on behalf of
such reductionist views.
Several authors (e.g. Bealer 1998, Jubien 2001, King 2007, King, Soames and Speaks
2014,  Melia  1992)  have  followed  the  lead  of  Benacerraf  and  raised  the  problem of
arbitrary identification against reductionist views of propositions. The problem has been
traditionally raised against views taking propositions to be unstructured abstract entities
or  structured  entities  conceived  of  in  a  Russellian  or  in  a  Fregean  way.  By  way  of
illustration, let us focus on the best-known unstructured account which takes propositions
to be world-theoretic abstract objects.1
Let us take possible worlds semantics to be the target reductive framework. Within this
framework, we might say that a proposition is a function from possible worlds to truth-
values:
λw. ⟦φ⟧w : W → {0, 1}
However, at this function corresponds exactly one set, i.e. the set of those elements the
function assigns 1. So, a proposition might also be the set of possible worlds at which the
sentence in question is true:
w⟦φ⟧w= 1
We therefore have the multiplicity ingredient: we can reduce propositions to more than
one world-theoretic entity.
The last ingredient to add is what I have called ‘equal adequacy’. Let me notice that all
the extant discussions of the problem of arbitrary identification for propositions overlook
the question of how equal adequacy is ensured.  The typical  move in the debate is to
mention the isomorphism between sets and characteristic functions and conclude that we
cannot choose one over the other in a non-arbitrary way. Yet, this is not sufficient to
explain  why  both  kinds  of  entities  are  equally  adequate  propositions-candidates.
Therefore,  I  deem  useful  to  show  how  to  properly  raise  the  problem  of  arbitrary
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identification for propositions.
I shall proceed first, by singling out what I shall call the proposition-properties, viz. the
properties a given entity should have in order to be a proposition.2 Secondly, I argue that
the adequacy constraint  arising out of  these proposition-properties  can be,  at  least  in
principle, met by the candidate reductions.
Proponents  of  different  brands  of  propositional  realism such as  Bealer  (1998),  King,
Soames, and Speaks (2014), and Stalnaker (1999), all agree that in order for an entity to
be a proposition, the entity must be:
(1) The compositional semantic value of sentences;
(2) the object of propositional attitudes;
(3) the content of illocutionary acts;
(4) the bearer of truth and modal properties;
(5) what we ascribe to others in attitude reports;
The conjunction of these statements provides what I shall call the propositional adequacy
constraint that any account of propositions (no matter whether reductionist or not) must
meet in order to be adequate.
At  this  stage,  however, one  might  wonder  whether  the  supporter  of  world-theoretic
unstructured accounts of propositions can solve the problem of arbitrary identification by
alleging that, since it is far from obvious that a single worldly entity can really satisfy the
propositional adequacy constraint, such constraint is prejudicial against world-theoretic
accounts of propositions. To elaborate on this train of thought, it is useful to pause on
David Lewis’s discussion of some of the proposition-properties mentioned above (see
e.g. Lewis 1979, 1980).
As is well-known, Lewis maintains that while only modally neutral contents (viz. sets of
possible worlds or their characteristic functions) can be the content of illocutionary acts,
he maintains  that  we need finer-grained contents  both to  account  for  the presence in
natural  language  of  certain  temporal  and  location  expressions  which  behave  as
intensional  operators,3 and to make sense of the special  nature of first-person (de se)
attitudes. Now, it seems safe to contend that, in order to have a distinctive challenge of
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arbitrary  identification,  the challenge  has  to  trade upon the existence  of  multiple and
equally adequate reductions, rather than on the fact that no adequate reduction can in the
end be provided. So, since Lewis explicitly denies that there can be a single worldly
entity playing all the proposition-roles, a Lewisean supporter of world-theoretic accounts
of propositions could take the propositional adequacy constraint to be prejudicial against
her view.
However, closer inspection reveals that this move does not enable the supporter of world-
theoretic accounts to avoid the problem of arbitrary identification.  To see why, let  us
focus on the following proposition-properties of being:
(3) The content of illocutionary acts;
(4) the bearer of truth and modal properties;
(5) what we ascribe to others in attitude reports. 
A  supporter  of  world-theoretic  unstructured  accounts  influenced  by  Lewis’s
considerations maintains that only modally neutral  contents can play these roles. Yet,
since  sets  of  possible  worlds  and functions  from possible  worlds  to  truth-values  are
equally  good  candidate  reductions  for  modally  neutral  contents,  and  since  they  are
different entities, the problem of arbitrary identification kicks in again.
The same point holds if we focus on a different combination, e.g. that involving the first,
the fourth, and the fifth proposition-properties. According to Lewis, only modally and
temporally neutral contents can have these properties. Yet, such contents can be reduced
to both sets of time-world pairs and functions from world-time pairs to truth-values. This
teaches us a more general lesson: unstructured accounts of propositions are vulnerable to
the  problem  of  arbitrary  identification  no  matter  which  version  of  the  propositional
adequacy constraint they adopt.
As has emerged from the foregoing discussion, the problem of arbitrary identification
targets  specific  adequacy-based,  as  it  were,  reductionist  realist  accounts  of  certain
entities,  such  as  numbers  and propositions.4 So,  the  problem vanishes  if  we endorse
nonreductionist  realist  accounts  of  these  entities;  or  if  we pursue  a  different  kind of
reductionist project which doesn’t rest solely on adequacy considerations;5 or else, if we
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give up the claim that these entities exist.
The  aim  of  this  paper,  however,  is  to  offer  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  arbitrary
identification  on  behalf  of  adequacy-based  reductionist  realism.  One  might  therefore
wonder: why save this brand of reductionism at all?
First, reductionist realisms are ontologically parsimonious: by reducing propositions and
numbers  to  entities  that  are  already  part  of  our  ontological  inventory,  such  as  sets,
functions, ordered pairs, and the like, we are not forced to unduly inflate our ontology.
Secondly, accounting for propositions and numbers in the adequacy-based way ensures
explanatory innocence. Numbers and propositions play certain roles, and there is little –
if any – disagreement amongst philosophers of arithmetic and philosophers of language
about the fact that they play the roles described by the arithmetic and the propositional
adequacy constraints. So, if we managed to tell what numbers and propositions are solely
on the basis of something everybody agrees on, our explanation of the nature of such
entities would exhibit significant explanatory innocence.
Thirdly, reductionist accounts of this sort might have further specific theoretical benefits.
To illustrate this point briefly, consider a version of the hard problem of the unity of
proposition asking us to explain why propositions have truth-conditions and are truth-apt
(call this the representation problem)6. Speaks (2014), and Stalnaker (1976), (1999), who
defend reductive accounts of propositions which are affected by the problem of arbitrary
identification, offer an elegant  deflationary  explanation of the representation problem.7
Stalnaker  maintains  that  propositions  are  world-theoretic  entities  which  are  given  by
ways or properties the world might have (see Stalnaker 1976), whereas Speaks (2014)
defends  the  view that  propositions  are  identical  to  such properties.  On Speaks’s  and
Stalnaker’s views, explaining why the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio is true or
false depending on whether she loves him or not amounts to explaining why the property
of  loving Cassio applies  to  Desdemona.  The explanation  is  easy:  properties,  by their
nature,  apply to things.  Punkt. Nothing more needs to  be said about  this.  Hence,  the
representation  problem  can  be  successfully  solved  within  Speaks’s  and  Stalnaker’s
reductionist  frameworks.  Thus,  since  rescuing  (at  least  some)  adequacy-based
reductionist  views  of  propositions  from the  problem of  arbitrary  identification  might
come with further significant theoretical payoffs, we have an additional reason to take up
6
the problem and solve it.8
Having clarified how to raise the problem of arbitrary identification and why we have
reasons to solve it, we can turn now to discuss its solution.
2 Solving the problem: the arbitrary reference strategy 
The remainder of this paper offers a full articulation of a specific strategy to solve the
problem of  arbitrary  identification,  namely  the arbitrary  reference  strategy.  Here is  a
concise statement of it.9 The reference of a numerical or a proposition term arbitrarily
picks out a single determinate object of the domain of candidate reductions fixed by a
given  reductive  framework  (e.g.  sets  for  numbers,  world-theoretic  entities  for
propositions, and so on). The fact that the reference is fixed arbitrarily is what explains
why we do not know the referents  of such expressions.  Accordingly,  the problem of
arbitrary identification is  solved as follows: the supporter  of the problem of arbitrary
identification is right in holding that we do not possess any reason to prefer one candidate
reduction over the other as the correct one, for we do not know which objects numbers-
and  propositions-naming  expressions  refer  to.  However,  from  our  ignorance  of  the
expressions’ referents it does not follow that such expressions do not refer. That is to say,
our ignorance of which candidate reduction is the correct one does not entail that there is
no correct reduction at all.
A first clear statement of the arbitrary reference strategy can be found in Breckenridge
and Magidor (2012: 397), even though they devote little space to the problem of arbitrary
identification. Before them, John P. Burgess, in a no longer available 2009 manuscript
titled ‘Putting structuralism in its place’, touches upon the arbitrary reference strategy in
the  context  of  problems  of  arbitrary  identification  arising  in  various  branches  of
mathematics.
Despite the increasing interest in arbitrary reference, though, I suspect that the strategy
just sketched does not enjoy much pre-theoretical support. The main reason, I conjecture,
is that the usual examples of referential expressions are such that we can somehow be in
touch, either via direct acquaintance relations or through causal chains of communication
7
of the sort envisaged by Kripke, with the objects referred to by such expressions. By
contrast, the arbitrary reference strategy holds that the reference of such expressions is
fixed, but we do not know how and we do not know which objects get to be the referents
of such expressions. ‘That’s a kind of magic’, a critic might urge.
To counter the initial  scepticism and evaluate  the prospects of the arbitrary reference
strategy, I submit that two main questions should be addressed.
First: ‘Since the thesis of arbitrary reference maintains that numbers- and propositions-
naming expressions pick out single determinate objects, it  seems legitimate to ask: in
virtue  of  what  numbers-  and  propositions-naming  expressions  refer  to  a  single
determinate object?’.  Call this the  metasemantic question. Metasemantic questions are
questions  such  as:  ‘In  virtue  of  what  a  given  expression  receive  the  semantics  it
receives?’; ‘What determines the semantic fact that a given expression has a such-and-
such  meaning?’.  Accordingly,  the  metasemantic  question  about  propositions-naming
expressions  can  be raised  as  follows:  ‘What  determines  which  of  the  various  world-
theoretic entities is picked out as the referent of a proposition-naming expression?’.
The second question can be formulated as follows: ‘Why does arbitrary reference explain
our  ignorance  of  the  referents  of  numerical  and  proposition  terms?’.  Call  this  the
epistemic question.
It is plausible to think that different answers to the metasemantic question might give rise
to different  answers  to  the epistemic  question.  So, since answering the latter  at  least
partly depends on answering the former, it makes sense to take the metasemantic question
first.
As far  as  I  can  see,  two answers  to  the  metasemantic  question  can  be  found in  the
literature on arbitrary reference. I shall now present them and raise some concerns which
motivate  the project  of  looking for  an alternative  way of  understanding the  arbitrary
reference strategy.
First  answer:  Breckenridge and Magidor (2012) handle the metasemantic question by
endorsing what I shall call semantic primitivism, namely the view that it is a primitive (or
fundamental)  semantic  fact  that  an  arbitrarily  referring  expression  picks  out  a  given
object. More specifically, semantic primitivism rejects the widely held view that semantic
facts  supervene upon use facts, viz. facts such as the speakers’ dispositions to use the
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expression in a given scenario, the physical structure of the environment, and so on. As a
consequence,  the  epistemic  question  is  answered  as  follows.  If  semantic  primitivism
about arbitrary reference is correct, and we also assume that we cannot have knowledge
of semantic facts unless we have knowledge of the use facts upon which they supervene,
from the fact that numerical  and proposition terms refer arbitrarily it follows that we
cannot know the semantic fact that these terms refer to such and such objects.
I will come back to semantic primitivism below. For the time being, however, let me just
flag that, despite the recent attempt at establishing semantic primitivism made by Kearns
and Magidor (2012), the denial of the supervenience thesis is, prima facie, very costly. In
addition, one may retort that invoking primitive semantic facts is but an  ad hoc move
which does not solve the mystery of how the reference of numerical  and proposition
terms gets fixed. Thus, for the time being, I shall content myself with noticing that it
would be unsurprising if one wanted to look for a way to develop the arbitrary reference
strategy which does not subscribe to semantic primitivism.10,11
Second answer: Boccuni (2013), Carrara and Martino (2010) and Martino (2001) adopt
what Martino (2001) has called  Acts of Choice Semantics.12 In a nutshell,  the Acts of
Choice Semantics envisages a series of ideal agents, who are pictured as having direct
access to the objects of the domain of discourse and who, through an arbitrary act of
choice,  are  able  to  single  out  any object  of  the domain  of  discourse in  an  ostensive
manner.  Hence  the reference  of  arbitrarily  referring  expressions  is  fixed via  an ideal
baptism. In the case of proposition and numerical terms, this is tantamount to saying that
ideal agents are appropriately connected to the relevant abstract objects and choose which
of these objects are the referents of the respective terms.
The Acts  of  Choice  Semantics  answers  the  metasemantic  question  by  preserving the
supervenience of semantic facts upon use facts, in that the semantic fact that an arbitrarily
referring  expression  picks  out  a  single  determinate  object  rather  than  another  is
determined by the act of choice of an ideal agent. Moreover, it explains the arbitrariness
of reference by appealing to an act of  choice being performed. As a consequence, the
epistemic question is answered as follows. If the Acts of Choice Semantics is correct, and
we assume that we cannot have access to the choices of the ideal agents, from the fact
that numerical and proposition terms refer arbitrarily it follows that we cannot know the
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semantic fact that these terms refer to such and such objects.
On reflection, however, even if the Acts of Choice Semantics has the advantage of being
compatible with the supervenience thesis, it falls prey to a different worry.13 The Acts of
Choice  semantics  is  explicitly  taken  by  its  proponents  to  be  an  idealisation  of  the
Kripkean idea of there to be an act of baptism whereby the reference of a proper name is
fixed (see Carrara and Martino 2010: 305). Since the agents fixing the reference are mere
idealisations, there is no actual domain of agents. This means that, as a matter of fact, no
actual  act  of baptism is  performed.  But if no actual  baptism is  performed,  and if  the
reference is only fixed ideally,  as opposed to being fixed in reality,  it  seems that we
should conclude that arbitrarily referring expressions do not, after all, refer.14
Let  us  take  stock.  The  two  answers  to  the  metasemantic  question  just  reviewed  are
contentious, though for different reasons. Since the answer to the epistemic question (at
least partly) depends on the answer to the metasemantic question, it follows that even the
epistemic question has not been satisfactorily addressed. However, since the solution to
the problem of arbitrary identification offered by the arbitrary reference strategy stands or
falls on the plausibility of the answers to the metasemantic and the epistemic question,
one might conclude that the problem cannot be satisfactorily solved by this strategy. I
think  that  this  would  be  too  hasty  a  conclusion,  though.  For  we  can  answer  the
metasemantic and the epistemic question in a better way, or so I argue in the next section.
3 The metasemantics of proposition and numerical terms
I shall begin with an explanation of the reference-fixing mechanism of proposition and
numerical terms, and then turn to answering the metasemantic question and the epistemic
question.
3.1 Explaining arbitrary reference-fixing
The view I shall defend is that the reference of proposition and numerical terms is fixed
via a definite description which picks out the object the relevant expression refers to. A
nowadays famous example is that of the descriptive name ‘Julius’. Gareth Evans coined
10
this name by introducing it into the language via the description ‘whoever invented the
zip’. To generalise: a reference-fixing description tells us how an entity should look like
in  order  for  it  to  be a  given expression’s  extension.  Thus,  in  order  to  determine  the
reference-fixing  descriptions  of  propositions-  and  numbers-naming  expressions,  a
promising  starting  point  is  to  look  at  the  propositional  adequacy  constraint  and  the
arithmetic adequacy constraint respectively, for such constraints pin down the properties
an entity should have in order for it to be a proposition and number, respectively.
I  therefore  submit  that  the  reference-fixing  description  of  a  proposition-naming
expression ‘p’ is the following: ‘the satisfier of the propositional adequacy constraint  s
such  that  s is  true  just  in  case  p’.  Thus,  if  we take  the  proposition  that  Price  is  a
goalkeeper, and we refer to it via the name ‘PRICE’, ‘PRICE’ picks out the satisfier of the
propositional adequacy constraint s such that s is true just in case Price is a goalkeeper.
Analogously, the reference-fixing description of a number-naming expression ‘n’ is this:
‘the  nth satisfier  of the arithmetic  adequacy constraint’.  That is to say, the reference-
fixing description of numerical terms is established by looking at the place the object
should occupy in a ω-sequence in order to be the referent of a given numerical term (e.g.
a numeral). So, ‘0’ picks out the least element of the satisfier of the arithmetic adequacy
constraint, ‘1’ picks out the next to the least element of the satisfier of the arithmetic
adequacy constraint, and so on and so forth.
To explain the workings of the reference-fixing mechanism just  introduced,  a  careful
analysis of the relevant definite descriptions is needed. Reference-fixing descriptions are
usually analysed in the standard Russellian way. Yet, a moment of reflection shows that
the Russellian analysis does not really clarify what it means for an expression to have its
reference fixed arbitrarily. As is well-known, Russell conceived of definite descriptions
as incomplete symbols that have meaning only if used in a sentence. So, a sentence such
as ‘The King of France is bald’ expresses the proposition that there exists a unique object
that is the king of France and that object is bald. Yet, given the presence of multiple and
equally adequate candidate referents for proposition and numerical terms, the Russellian
analysis does not say anything about how, via the relevant description, we manage to pick
out just one object amongst such candidates as the referent of the target term.
To make progress with this issue, I propose embracing an alternative analysis of definite
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descriptions,  the  so-called  Hilbertian  analysis.15 The  Hilbertian  analysis  formalises  a
definite  description  such  as  ‘The  F’  by  using  Hilbert’s  ε-term  this  way:  εxFx.
Syntactically,  the  ε-term is a variable-binding operator that,  just like Russell’s  ι-term,
allows us to form a term from a sentential form. That is to say, if F is a formula and x a
variable, εxF is a term.
Let an epsilon calculus be any deductive system describing the logical behavior of the ε-
term. An epsilon calculus consists of the usual axioms and deduction rules of first-order
logic plus the following two axioms:
(A1) F(t) → F(εxF(x))
(A2) ∀x(F(x) ↔ G(x)) → εxF(x) = εxG(x) 
The  first  axiom scheme introduces  the  ε-term into  the  language.  The second axiom,
sometimes called the extensionality axiom, says that if two formulas are equivalent then
their ε-expressions are identical.
Semantically, the ε-term behaves as a choice function. A choice function on a collection
F of nonempty sets assigns to each set s in F one element of s. If there are any Fs, then
εxFx selects one object out of the Fs. By contrast, if there are not any, then εxFx selects
one object from the whole universe. 
In order to provide an analysis of definite (as opposed to indefinite) descriptions by using
Hilbert’s ε-term, two presuppositions must be in place (see Slater 1988). First, there are
Fs;  secondly,  there  is  a  unique  object  that  is  F.  If  we  presuppose  both  things,  the
description ‘The F’ means, roughly, something like ‘the unique chosen object x such that
x is F’.16
Having clarified this, let  us now deploy the Hilbertian reading to analyse the definite
description ‘the satisfier of the propositional adequacy constraint’,  which is the stable
part  of  all  reference-fixing  descriptions  of  proposition  terms.  The  reductionist  realist
projects  we  are  considering  do  presuppose  the  existence  of  propositions.  It  also
presupposes  that  ‘p’  picks  out  a  unique  object.  The  arbitrary  reference  strategy  is
precisely meant to explain how to redeem such a presupposition while, at the same time,
granting that there be multiple and equally adequate candidate entities ‘p’ could refer to.
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That being said, let us take now the collection of all objects satisfying the propositional
adequacy constraint. The choice function selects one object out of the collection of all
objects satisfying the propositional adequacy constraint completely randomly. Hence, the
reference-fixing  description  of  a  proposition-naming  expression  ‘p’  selects  a  worldly
entity satisfying the constraint as the referent of the expression such that the selected
worldly entity is true just in case p. So, a proposition-naming expression such as ‘p’ is a
device  of  direct  reference,  for  it  contributes  an  object  to  the  truth-conditions  of  the
sentence in which it occurs. However, we do not know whether it is a set of possible
worlds that obtain just in case p, or whether it is the characteristic function of such set.
Let  us  turn  now to  numerical  terms.  The  description  ‘the  satisfier  of  the  arithmetic
adequacy  constraint’,  which  is  the  stable  part  of  all  reference-fixing  descriptions  of
numerical terms, picks out a sequence out of the collection of all sequences satisfying the
arithmetic adequacy constraint. Let us take, for instance, the description ‘The next to the
least  element  of  the  satisfier  of  the  arithmetic  adequacy  constraint’,  which  is  the
reference-fixing description of the numeral ‘1’: ‘1’ refers to the next to the least element
of the chosen set-theoretic progression that satisfies the arithmetic adequacy constraint.
However, we do not know whether the randomly selected sequence is Zermelo’s, von
Neumann’s, or any other sequence.
I have unpacked the idea that the reference of proposition and numerical terms is fixed in
an  arbitrary  way by  appealing  to  Hilbert’s  ε-term.  I  hasten  to  acknowledge  that  the
connections  between Hilbert’s  ε-term and the idea of  arbitrariness  have already been
pointed  out  by  various  authors.  Slater  (1988)  mentions  the  possibility  of  analysing
arbitrary parameters in instantial reasoning via Hilbert’s  ε-term, but he never addresses
the problem of arbitrary identification.  Burgess (2009) mentions only very briefly the
possibility of harnessing Hilbert’s ε-term to solve the problem of arbitrary identification.
So, I regard the previous proposal as taking the inspiration from Slater’s and Burgess’
insights.
Be that  as  it  may,  it  appears  fair  to  say that  the  prospects  of  the  arbitrary  reference
strategy chiefly depend on answering the metasemantic question which, in turn, enables
us to answer the epistemic question. So, a proper treatment of the metasemantic question
is called for. To this task I shall turn in the next section.
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3.2 Answering the metasemantic question and the epistemic question
The view I have defended in the previous section has it that numerical and proposition
terms receive their reference in virtue of a choice function that selects their referents out
of the collection of all the candidate referents. This offers a preliminary answer to the
metasemantic question. On reflection, though, the choice function fixing the reference of
propositions- and numbers-naming expressions is an arbitrary one. That is to say, it could
well be the case that a numeral ‘n’ is associated with the reference-fixer ‘εxFx’ picking
out a Zermelo set, whereas a numeral ‘m’ is associated with the reference-fixer ‘εxGx’
picking  out  a  von  Neumann  set.  So,  what  guarantees  that  that  the  choice  function
selecting the invariant part of all reference-fixing descriptions is the same across all such
descriptions? This sends back to the problem of choosing an arbitrary choice function.
This  suggests  that,  given  the  explanation  of  arbitrary  reference-fixing  I  offer,  the
metasemantic question should be reformulated as follows: “What determines the choice
function that determines the reference of the description ‘the satisfier of the propositional
adequacy constraint’?”.17
This question can be answered by delving a little more into metasemantic considerations.
A somewhat successful metasemantic approach has it that semantic facts supervene upon
use facts and naturalness facts. This view has been famously put forward by David Lewis
in his seminal paper ‘New work for a theory of universals’, and subsequently defended
and developed by, amongst others, Sider (2001, 2011) and Weatherson (2003). Lewis’s
idea, in a nutshell, is that there are different levels of reality ordered on the basis of their
degree of naturalness. To illustrate the idea, let us focus on properties. At the very bottom
there are what Lewis calls perfectly natural properties, viz. the properties that carve out
the  joints  of  nature.  Lewis  takes  the  notion  of  naturalness  to  be  primitive,  but  a
commonly  accepted  heuristic  to  compare  different  degrees  of  naturalness  consists  in
focusing on the degree of  objective similarity exhibited by the members of a given set
(Bear in mind that, for Lewis, properties are sets). To use a nowadays famous example:
the property of being green is more natural than the property of being grue because, even
though green things form a rather heterogenous set, they are more alike than the grue
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things are.18
The Lewisean metasemantic view has it that the referent of a term is the most natural
entity  that  is  more-or-less  consistent  with  the  usage  of  the  term.  Take  the  predicate
‘green’: while both green and grue fit our dispositions to use ‘green’, since green is a
more natural property than grue is, green is a more eligible candidate referent for ‘green’
than grue is. This approach is extended by Lewis himself to the reference of singular
terms, as is witnessed by the example of the cat referred to by ‘Bruce’ in Lewis (1983).19
By adopting a Lewisean metasemantics, we can maintain that the semantic fact to the
effect that a proposition-naming expression ‘p’ refers to the chosen object s satisfying the
propositional adequacy constraint such that  s is true just in case p supervenes upon use
facts and naturalness facts.
I propose to regard use facts as those facts in virtue of which the propositional adequacy
constraint  obtains.  So,  roughly  put,  the  use  facts  pertaining  to  propositions-naming
expressions  are  constituted  by  the  way  a  group  of  experts  in  our  community,  i.e.
semanticists and philosophers of language, use such expressions. Since we have seen that
philosophers  of  language  and  semanticists  use  proposition  terms  to  talk  about  those
entities  having  the  properties  that  constitute  the  propositional  adequacy  constraint,  it
seems safe  to  claim  that  the  relevant  use  facts  are  encapsulated  in  the  propositional
adequacy constraint.
Use facts  enable  us to  rule  out  clear  cases  of  entities  which cannot  act  as candidate
referents for propositions-naming expressions. For instance, given the way philosophers
and  semanticists  use  propositions-naming  expressions,  syntactic  entities  such  as
sentences  can  be  ruled  out  as  potential  candidate  referents  for  proposition  terms.
Moreover, since the propositional adequacy constraint is the stable part of the reference-
fixing  descriptions  of  proposition  terms,  it  is  clear  that  use  facts  play  a  role  in
determining the meaning of such terms.
Given  the  analysis  of  the  relevant  definite  descriptions  offered  above,  the  use  of
proposition terms does not require us to choose one specific world-theoretic object rather
than another. That is to say, since both sets of possible worlds and their characteristic
functions  are  able  to do the job,  referents  of propositions-naming expressions can be
chosen completely randomly. To repeat,  what  really  matters  is  that  the chosen entity
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possesses  the  relevant  proposition-properties  constituting  the  propositional  adequacy
constraint.20
The  foregoing  explains  what  role  use  facts  play  in  determining  the  meaning  of
proposition terms. Use facts determine which definite descriptions fix the reference of
such terms. Clearly, however, facts about the usage of propositions-naming expressions
are not so fine-grained as to determine which choice function does the work of fixing the
referent, for there might be different choice functions which would fit such an usage.
Here the second component of the Lewisean metasemantic approach comes into play. If
entities are ordered on the basis of their naturalness, and if semantic facts supervene upon
both use facts and naturalness facts, the supporter of the arbitrary reference strategy can
maintain that there is a choice function that is more natural than any other one, even
though we do not know which one it is.  Of course,  this requires an extension of the
naturalness talk to abstracta, i.e. choice functions. Surely, while we can have a grasp of
the differences in naturalness between entities populating the concrete reality in virtue of
our access to such entities and observation of their objective similarities, we cannot have
a similar grasp of the differences in naturalness of abstract objects,  in that we lack a
plausible epistemology of abstracta. This, I contend, is what happens with the choice
function contributing to fixing the reference of proposition and number terms. The claim
I am making is that there is a privileged choice function such that the satisfier of the
arithmetic adequacy constraint is the same for all numerals Yet, since we do not have an
epistemic access to the domain of abstracta, we do not know which function it is. 
To forestall misunderstandings: I am not claiming here that there is a semantic fact  sf1,
e.g. that ‘n’ refers to a Zermelo set, which is more natural than another semantic fact sf2,
e.g.  that  ‘n’  refers  to  a  von  Neumann  set.  Appealing  to  naturalness  at  the  level  of
semantic  facts  cannot  solve  the  problem  of  arbitrary  identification  on  behalf  of  the
adequacy-based reductionist realist we are considering here. Let me explain.
It  bears  repeating  that  the  reductionist  realisms  affected  by  the  problem of  arbitrary
identification maintain the distinctive thesis  that the only criteria to take into account
while assessing whether a given entity is a number or a proposition are provided by the
arithmetic and propositional adequacy constraints, respectively. So, if we said that, of the
two options, functions from worlds to truth-values or sets of worlds, one of them is the
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more natural candidate entity for being a proposition but we just can’t know which, we
would  be  introducing  another  element,  i.e.  naturalness,  which  would  help  us  decide
which thing is a proposition and which thing is not. Yet, doing so amounts to violating
the  propositional  reductionist  credo  that  all  there  is  to  establishing  the  nature  of
propositions  is  given  by  the  proposition-properties  constituting  the  propositional
adequacy  constraint.  Similarly,  if  we  said  that  of  the  infinitely  many  set-theoretic
progressions which satisfy the arithmetic adequacy constraint one is more natural than
any other, we would be violating the arithmetic structuralist credo that the essence of
numbers is given by their order-theoretic properties only.
However, the adequacy-based reductionist realist need not impose any constraint on how
metasemantic  facts  should  look  like.  So,  the  adequacy-based  reductionist  realist  can
clearly accept the claim I making to the effect there is a choice function - which, together
with  the  use  facts  encapsulated  in  the  relevant  definite  descriptions,  determines  the
semantic  fact  that ‘n’  refers arbitrarily  to  the nth satisfier  of the arithmetic  adequacy
constraint - that is more natural than any other. Thus, on the view I offer, naturalness is
appealed to at the level of what fixes the non-semantic facts that are the supervenience
base  of  semantic  facts  of  the  form:  ‘n’  refers  arbitrarily  to  the  nth  satisfier  of  the
arithmetic adequacy constraint.
This completes my answer to the metasemantic question. In light of this, we can now
address the epistemic question.
It must be kept in mind that the epistemic question asks why arbitrary reference explains
our ignorance of the referents of proposition (and numerical)  terms. My answer is as
follows. The articulation of the arbitrary reference strategy on offer maintains that the
reference  of proposition  terms is  partly  determined by naturalness  facts.  The specific
naturalness facts appealed to are facts about choice functions. Since choice functions are
abstract entities, and since we do not (yet) have a viable epistemology of abstract entities,
we are currently unable to access the naturalness ordering of choice functions. So, since
we are unable to know which choice function has contributed to fixing the referents of
proposition (and numerical) terms. But if we are unable to know which choice function
has picked out the objects, we cannot know which objects have been picked out as the
referents of proposition (and numerical) terms. Hence, what explains our ignorance of the
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referents of proposition and numerical terms is our ignorance of the naturalness ordering
of the functions which contribute to fixing the reference of such terms.21
4 Assessing the (new) arbitrary reference strategy
Now  that  the  details  of  the  new  version  of  arbitrary  reference  strategy  have  been
presented,  we can turn to provide a costs-benefit  analysis  of the strategy. I shall  first
consider  two questions  about  my version of  the arbitrary reference  strategy and then
address two general concerns about the strategy itself.
4.1 Two questions about my version of the strategy
First question: One might wonder: ‘Why is your view any better than Breckenridge and
Magidor’s and Martino’s? More specifically, why should one accept your answer to the
metasemantic question and, consequently, your answer to the epistemic question?’.
Answer: I diagnose the source of this concern in the suspicion that invoking naturalness
facts about choice functions is as ad hoc as either taking semantic facts to be primitive or
invoking  ideal  agents.  I  believe  that  this  suspicion  is  misplaced.  As  a  first  general
consideration, let me emphasise that the appeal to naturalness is independently motivated
by Lewis’s insightful approach to the nature of reality.  Roughly put, if reference is a
relation  between an expression and an existing  thing,  then  there is  no  ad-hocness in
holding a view about why a given reference relation obtains which relies upon a given
(and  independently  attractive)  metaphysical  picture.  Secondly,  it  is  worth  keeping in
mind  that  naturalness  facts  play  an  explanatory  role  in  addressing  other  major
metasemantic problems, such as Kripkenstein’s rule-following paradox, Putnam’s model-
theoretic argument, Quine’s indeterminacy of reference.
Having said that, let us compare the metasemantics I endorse with semantic primitivism.
Kearns and Magidor (2012), who have put forward an extensive defence of semantic
primitivism, stress that semantic primitivism has never been put on the table as a real
option to solve the classical metasemantic problems mentioned in the previous paragraph.
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However, in a footnote (Kearns and Magidor 2012: fn. 3, p. 323) Kearns and Magidor
explicitly claim that they ‘assume’ that a global form about scepticism about meaning is
false (call this view semantic scepticism). So, their argument seems to run as follows: if
global  semantic  scepticism  is  false,  then  there  are  semantic  facts.  If  we  reject  the
supervenience  claim,  then  semantic  facts  are  primitive  (or  fundamental).  However,  I
cannot help but ask: how can we simply assume that semantic scepticism is false without
begging the question against the Kripkensteinean sceptic?
It is indeed worth bearing in mind that Kripkenstein’s rule-following paradox is meant to
show that  the supervenience  of  semantic  facts  upon use facts  does not  obtain.  If  we
accept this conclusion, and if we do not want to appeal to naturalness facts, we have two
options left: either we accept semantic scepticism, or we accept semantic primitivism.
The question is: why should we accept the latter rather than the former? As far as I can
see, beside the remark in the aforementioned footnote to the effect that they assume that
global scepticism about meaning is false, Kearns and Magidor do not offer any answer to
this  question.  And  yet,  this  assumption  simply  begs  the  question  against  the
Kripkensteinean sceptic. By contrast, the appeal to naturalness facts seems to be less an
ad hoc response to the challenge raised by the semantic sceptic: such a response does not
simply assume without argument that there are semantic facts, for it attempts at offering
an explanation of why there are semantic facts which partly relies on an independently
attractive  metaphysical  picture  of  reality.  Thus  the  explanatory  gain  of  locating  the
epistemological mystery, as it were, at the level of metasemantic facts, like my version of
the arbitrary reference strategy does, as opposed to locating it at the level of semantic
facts,  as  Breckenridge  and  Magidor’s  version  of  the  strategy  does,  is  that  doing  so
enables us to avoid begging the question against the semantic sceptic.
Let us now briefly contrast the metasemantic picture upheld by the supporters of the Acts
of Choice Semantics with the one I am recommending. The metasemantic view I defend
is such that it preserves Martino’s insight to the effect that the reference of arbitrarily
referring  expressions  is  chosen  randomly.  However,  it  does  so  without  the  costly
commitment to there being ideal acts of baptism which do not fix the reference of such
expressions in reality. On the version of the arbitrary reference strategy I have developed,
the reference-fixing is not ideal, but real.
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Second question: One might worry that proposition and numerical terms have not been
introduced into the language via the definite descriptions I take to be playing the role of
fixing  their  reference.  One  might  indeed  worry  that  once  the  numeral  ‘1’  has  been
introduced in the Hindu-Arabic tradition, the relevant description ‘The F’ was certainly
different from the one proposed here.22 How to make sense of this?
Answer:  To begin with, let me draw our attention to the fact that numerals and other
numbers-naming expressions can have various uses. My aim here is solely to capture the
use that is made in the formal theory we call arithmetic, that is, the theory of the natural
numbers as defined by the Dedekind-Peano axioms. I will qualify this claim below, while
responding to a worry about the general shape of the arbitrary reference strategy. For the
time being, however, let me emphasise that the boundaries of arithmetic discourse have
been fixed only in the 19th century thanks to the work of (among others) Dedekind and
Peano, who came up with a formally precise definition of the numbers. So, past uses of
the numerals are not our concern here. 
Having said that, I also want to suggest that the reference-fixing descriptions deployed by
my account do bear some relation to uses of numerals made before the appearance of the
Dedekind-Peano  axioms.  It  seems  indeed  plausible  to  maintain  that  numerals  were
originally  introduced  to  refer  to  something  we  count  with,  as  it  were.  On  closer
inspection, this rough description may be seen as the ancestor of the idea that numbers
are those entities that are used to count collections. As has emerged previously, this is
one of the two clauses of the arithmetic adequacy constraint.
This suggests that the process of reference-fixing in the case of numerals originated many
centuries  ago,  and  gradually  unfolded  until  the  formally  precise  formulation  of  the
Dedekind-Peano  axioms  and  a  proper  understanding  the  concept  of  cardinality  were
available. Thus, even if a numeral ‘n’ was not introduced in the language via the definite
description ‘the nth satisfier of the arithmetic adequacy constraint’, such a description is
the  outcome of  a  gradual  process  of  reference-fixing  which  has  its  roots  in  the  first
historical introduction of numerals and its complete fulfillment in the formulation of the
arithmetic adequacy constraint.
The foregoing train of thought is further supported by the observation that reference-
fixing need not be a matter of quick and easy stipulation. Surely, there are cases in which
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the  process  of  reference-fixing  is  a  farily  easy  stipulative  act,  e.g.  Evans’s  case  of
‘Julius’. In other cases, the process could take a couple of years and involve a small
community. Take the case of ‘Jack the Ripper’. The name has been introduced in 1888
via a  certain  definite  description,  say ‘the murderer  of prostitutes  in  the East  End of
London’. Then, being more specific about the location modified the description in, say,
this  way: ‘the murderer  of five prostitutes in the Whitechapel  district’.  Around 1891,
‘Jake the Ripper’ referred to whoever satisfied the description ‘the murderer of eleven
prostitutes in the Whitechapel district between April 1888 and February 1891’. Thus, the
process of reference-fixing of ‘Jake the Ripper’ was gradual and the relevant reference-
fixing  description  changed  depending  on the  new information  acquired  by  London’s
police  during  the  investigation.  In  the  case  of  numerals,  the  process  lasted  several
centuries and involved different communities of mathematicians.
Let us turn now to two more general questions about the arbitrary reference strategy.
 
4.2 Two questions about the strategy in general
Third  question:  The  arbitrary  reference  strategy  assumes  that  both  propositions-  and
numbers- naming expressions are referential. On the basis of this assumption, it provides
an account of how they refer that enables the reductionist to respond to the problem of
arbitrary  identification.  And  yet,  it  is  doubtful  that  proposition  and  numerical  terms
always  behave  as  referential  expressions  in  a  number  of  different  natural  language
constructions.23 How  does  a  supporter  of  the  arbitrary  reference  strategy  defend  the
referentiality assumption?
Answer: As said above, I acknowledge the existence of a variety of uses of proposition
and numerical terms, some of which might well not be referential. Yet, I believe that this
does not undermine the arbitrary reference strategy. To see why, we should bear in mind
that the strategy is put to service to the adequacy-based reductionist realist. Thus, in order
to pursue a proper assessment of the strategy, it is important to understand the kind of
project the adequacy-based reductionist realist is after.
As far as I can tell,  the reductionist is no natural language linguist: her aim is not to
account for all uses of numbers- or propositions-naming expressions. Rather, her focus is
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on those uses which are integral to the account of the nature of the target discourse, e.g.
arithmetic  discourse  and  semantic  discourse.  Thus,  we  can  set  aside  many  natural
language  constructions  and  focus  instead  on  those  constructions  used  by  working
mathematicians  and semanticists.  To illustrate  what  I  have  in  mind,  take  the case  of
arithmetic  discourse.  It  is  a  well-known result  that  every  arithmetic  sentence  can  be
paraphrased by sentences containing first-order quantifiers, the identity symbol, the set-
membership relation, and the expressions  ‘N’, ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘+’, ‘×’. The arithmetic realist
contends that ‘N’, ‘0’, ‘1’ behave as proper names: ‘0’ and ‘1’ refer to objects which are
elements  of  ‘N’,  while  ‘+’  and ‘×’  denote  functions.  The  realist  who  is  also  a  set-
theoretic reductionist  maintains that ‘N’ refers to a set of sets of which the referents of
‘0’ and ‘1’ are elements. Since we could state the core reductionist thesis in this minimal
way, what matters is to deploy the arbitrary reference strategy only with regard to the
referential uses of these expressions. Thus, the existence of different (and non-referential)
uses of numbers-naming expressions in different natural languages does not undermine
the deployment of the arbitrary reference strategy.
As  for  semantic  discourse,  things  are  more  complex.  To  begin  with,  we  should
acknowledge  that  the  propositional  realist  uses  three  types  of  expressions  to  refer  to
propositions:
(a) Proper names: p
(b) Definite descriptions: the proposition p
(c) ‘That’-clauses: that p
As is well-known, the question whether all uses of proper names, definite descriptions,
and ‘that’-clauses are referential is hotly debated. To illustrate the difficulty, take proper
names.  In  light  of  the  recent  debate  between  referentialism and  predicativism,24 one
might  argue  that  there  are  uses  of  proper  names which  are apparently  predicative  as
opposed  to  referential,  and  the  best  theory  that  accounts  for  all  these  uses  is
predicativism.
However,  we can sidestep  such predicative  uses by contending that  the propositional
reductionist, just like the arithmetic reductionist, tries to capture the use of proposition
22
names  within  semantic  theory.  Since  those  uses  are  referential,  the  propositional
reductionist can focus on them only. The same sort of consideration can be deployed in
the  case  of  definite  descriptions,  for  it  is  widely  acknowledged  that  they  have  both
referential and attributive uses.
We  are  therefore  left  with  ‘that’-clauses.  Surely,  semanticists  disagree  over  whether
‘that’-clauses have referential uses at all, so the propositional reductionist cannot simply
maintain that such expressions, when used in semantic theorising, have a referential use
only. Thus, let us concede, for the sake of argument, that ‘that’-clauses are not referential
expressions. How to analyse them?
A prominent  non-referential  analysis  is  the  one  offered  in  Recanati  (2004).  Recanati
proposes to treat ‘that’-clauses as restricted existential quantifiers and paraphrase a ‘that’-
clause such as ‘that p’ as follows: ‘For some p such that p is true iff S’, where ‘p’ is an
objectual variable ranging over propositions and ‘S’ stands for the sentence embedded in
the ‘that’-clause.
Interestingly, a version of the problem of arbitrary identification can be raised even if we
accept Recanati’s quantificational analysis of ‘that’-clauses. One might indeed wonder:
do  the  objectual  variables  range  over  sets  of  possible  worlds,  or  their  characteristic
functions? Insofar as there is no non-arbitrary reason to prefer one domain of discourse
over  the other,  we might  conclude  that  the domain  of  discourse for  the  quantifier  is
empty.
Fortunately, however, I believe that the specific version of the arbitrary reference strategy
I have been developing can be suitably modified so as to block this alternative version of
the problem of arbitrary identification. One of the noteworthy features of epsilon calculi
is  that,  given  the  two  distinctive  axioms  of  such  calculi  mentioned  above,  we  can
explicitly define quantifiers as follows:
() xFx ↔ FεxFx
() xFx ↔ Fεx¬Fx
We can therefore take the sentence ‘For some  p such that p is true iff  S’ to mean the
following: ‘For the chosen object p satisfying the propositional adequacy constraint such
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that  p is true iff  S’,  where ‘p’ is an objectual variable ranging over only one kind of
world-theoretic entity (but we do not know which one it is). This enables us to randomly
restrict the range of quantification of the objectual variables involved in the analysis of
the meaning of ‘that’-clauses, thereby mirroring what we did with the reference-fixing
mechanism of referential proposition terms.
The foregoing shows that appealing to a choice-theoretic semantics can solve the problem
of arbitrary identification even if we strip off its referentialist component. This ensures a
certain theoretical flexibility in the deployment of the general strategy here outlined that
cannot but be welcomed by the propositional reductionist.
Fourth question: Finally, one might wonder: ‘Are there any other strategies for solving
the problem of arbitrary identification on behalf of reductionist realists? If so, what’s the
advantage of the arbitrary reference strategy over these alternatives?’.
Answer: There are other solutions on the market, but they have already received some
criticism. In a 1999 paper, Joseph G. Moore considers and rejects a strategy relying on
the  idea  that  the  reference  of  proposition  and numerical  terms  is  indeterminate.  The
notion of indeterminacy can be cashed out in both semantic and ontic terms. As for the
semantic  interpretation,  the  driving  thought  is  that  the  correct  semantics  of,  say,
propositions-naming  expressions  is  supervaluationist,  and  the  multiple  candidate
reductions act as different but equally legitimate way of sharpening the meaning of a
proposition term such as ‘p’. Moore, however, argues that various candidate propositions
(sets of possible worlds, functions from worlds to truth-values, sets of ordered pairs, and
so on) cannot serve as sharpenings of the meaning of propositions terms (Moore 1999:
244-246). By contrast, the ontic interpretation of indeterminacy gives rise to the idea that
proposition terms refer to vague objects. Besides mentioning some general worries about
vague  objects,  Moore  lays  out  a  modal  argument  which  rules  out  the  possibility  of
regarding propositions as vague objects (Moore 1999: 247-248).
A careful assessment of Moore’s arguments would lead us astray. However, let me just
flag that since the arbitrary reference strategy nowhere appeals to (ontic or semantic)
indeterminacy, it is immune to the worries raised by Moore regarding vague objects and
candidate sharpenings. Thus, it seems that the arbitrary reference strategy enables us to
make significant progress with respect to the evaluation of reductionist accounts: insofar
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as  one  wants  to  undermine  such  accounts  by  raising  the  problem  of  arbitrary
identification, one has to take issue with the new version of arbitrary reference strategy
and show where it fails.
5 Conclusion 
The paper has offered a solution to the problem of arbitrary identification by articulating
the semantic and metasemantic details of the arbitrary reference strategy. Proposition and
numerical  terms  pick  out  single  determinate  objects  arbitrarily.  The  reference-fixing
mechanism of  such terms  involves  complex definite  descriptions.  The reference  of  a
numerical  term such ‘1’ is this:  ‘The next to the least  element  of the satisfier  of the
arithmetic  adequacy  constraint’.  The  reference-fixing  description  is  complex  since  it
presents a changing component and a stable component. The changing component, which
is  expressed  here  by  ‘The  next  to  the  least  element’,  changes  depending  on  which
numerical  terms we focus on.  The stable component,  which is expressed here by the
embedded definite  description  ‘The satisfier  of  the  arithmetic  adequacy constraint’  is
formalised via Hilbert’s  ε-term, whose interpretation is a choice function. Thus, if we
take set theory to be the target reductive framework of arithmetic, the choice function
selects  randomly  one  amongst  the  (infinitely  many)  set-theoretic  progressions  which
satisfy  the  arithmetic  adequacy  constraint.  The  same  holds,  mutatis  mutandis,  for
proposition terms. 
At  the  metasemantic  level,  it  is  contended  that  what  fixes  the  reference  of  such
expressions  are  both  use  facts,  i.e.  facts  about  how  working  semanticists  and
mathematicians  use  proposition  and  numerical  terms,  and  naturalness  facts,  i.e.  facts
about which choice function whereby part of the semantics of these terms gets fixed is
the most natural one. Some possible objections to the arbitrary reference strategy have
been addressed.
To conclude.  I believe that adequacy-based reductionist  realists  about entities  such as
numbers and propositions should rejoice, for they have a novel and full-fledged response
to the problem of arbitrary identification. To forestall misunderstandings, however, the
discussion pursued in this paper is not meant to amount to a full vindication of (some of)
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these  reductionist  views.  However,  by  showing  how  the  problem  of  arbitrary
identification can be successfully solved, I hope that this paper can be regarded as a first
step towards such a vindication.
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1 Four quick points are in order. First, throughout the paper I will focus on the world-theoretic view of propositions, but
my arguments should carry over to all the reductionist views about propositions affected by the problem of arbitrary
identification,  most  notably  the  Russellian  and  Fregean  structured  accounts.  Secondly,  let  me  clarify  that  while
Benacerraf took his argument to undermine arithmetic realism and provide an argument for a structuralist version of
nominalism, there are some authors (e.g. Bealer and King) raising the problem against e.g. world-theoretic accounts of
propositions  while,  at  the  same  time,  believing  that  the  problem  undermines  these  accounts  without  ipso  facto
undermining propositional realism. Thirdly, Caplan and Tillman (2013), and Dixon and Gilmore (2016) have argued,
respectively, that King’s (2007, 2014) and Speaks’s (2014) new reductionist views are also affected by the problem of
arbitrary identification. Fourthly, the problem of arbitrary identification affects also set-theoretic reductions of ordered
pairs. These last two points indicate the pervasiveness of such a problem, and I indeed conjecture that the problem could
emerge in other similar reductionist realist enterprises, even though I cannot argue for this point here.
2 I shall sometimes speak of proposition-roles instead of proposition-properties.
3 This is  similar to Dummett’s claim that  we need to distinguish between  assertoric content and  ingredient sense
(Dummett 1973). See Ninan (2010) for further discussion.
4 I will henceforth omit ‘natural’, for the paper focuses solely on the natural numbers.
5 For instance, Clarke-Doane (2008) and Steinhart (2002) have argued that there is more to establishing which set-
theoretic progression is the sequence of the numbers than adequacy considerations.
6 The label is Eklund’s (Eklund forthcoming).
7 See also Pickel (forthcoming) for another deflationary explanation using structured propositions.
8 Of course, different reductionist views will claim to have more or different specific theoretical benefits. I won’t go
into a discussion of what such benefits may be.
9 The very idea of arbitrary  reference  has been primarily articulated to make sense of the semantic behaviour of
arbitrary parameters in instantial reasoning. To illustrate this briefly, take existential instantiation: if we have derived
xF(x) we can introduce a new parameter ‘a’ that does not occur in the general formula xF(x) or in any undischarged
assumption supporting the formula, and assume Fa. The complete generality of existential instantiation is achieved by
letting the rule be valid whatever a is. Boccuni (2013), Breckenridge and Magidor (2012), Carrara and Martino (2010),
and Martino (2001) defend the contention that the parameter ‘a’ arbitrarily refers to an object of the domain of discourse
satisfying F(x), yet we do not know which object that is. Let me notice that this is not the only interpretation of the
behaviour  of  arbitrary  parameters  in  instantial  reasoning  (see  e.g.  Fine  1985  and  Pettigrew  2008  for  other
interpretations).  However,  it  is  not  my aim here  to  assess  different  views  about  arbitrary  parameters  in  instantial
reasoning.
10 Given semantic primitivism, and given that propositions are semanticalia, as it were, it seems that Breckenridge and
Magidor should be nonreductionist about propositions. Thanks to Samuele Chilovi and Michael Murez for discussion of
this point.
11 I won’t focus here on the second premise of the semantic primitivist answer to the epistemic question sketched
above to the effect that we cannot know semantic facts unless we have knowledge of the use facts upon which they
supervene.
12 To forestall misunderstandings, these authors do not claim that the problem of arbitrary identification could be
solved via the arbitrary reference strategy, for they are mainly concerned with arbitrary reference in instantial reasoning.
So, I am extending the view to the case of proposition and numerical terms.
13 Again, I shall here take issue solely with the answer to the metasemantic question. So, I won’t be focusing on the
second premise of this answer to the epistemic question.
14 The Acts of Choice Semantics could be further developed in two different directions. On the one hand, one might
interpret  such  semantics  in  pretence-theoretic/fictionalist  terms.  That  is  to  say,  we  can  pretend  that  agents  are
acquainted  with  the  relevant  abstract  objects  and  choose  them as  the  referents  of  number  and  proposition  terms.
However, this fictionalist interpretation does not give rise to a realist solution to the problem of arbitrary identification.
On the other hand, one might conceive of our practice of using proposition and numerical terms as bringing into the
existence the very referents of such terms. This would make the referents of proposition and numerical terms akin to
abstract artifacts. Even though this view can deliver a realist-friendly picture of the reference-fixing mechanism of the
relevant expressions, it is not faithful to the reductionist approach, for a new category of objects, i.e. abstract artifacts,
would have to be introduced in our ontological inventory. Thanks to François Recanati for discussion of this point.
15 See Hilbert and Bernays (1939), Slater (1988).
16 As a consequence, while Russell’s ι-term is an incomplete symbol, Hilbert’s ε-term can be taken to play the role of
what Russell calls logically proper names. This is why, in the Hilbertian reading, definite descriptions have a meaning
independently of their use in a sentence.
17 I will henceforth focus, for the sake of simplicity, on proposition terms. But the following considerations carry over
to numerical terms.
18 Following Nelson Goodman’s definition, let us say that an object is grue if and only if the object is either (a) green
and has been observed before now, or (b) blue, and has not been observed before now.
19 See also Cameron (2010) and Sider (2011) for other extensions of naturalness beyond properties.
20 The same consideration applies,  mutatis mutandis, to numbers-naming expressions. That is to say, the working
mathematician does not care whether ‘2’ picks out a Zermelo set or a von Neumann set: all that matters is that the
chosen entity is the next to the next to the least element of the chosen ω-sequence.
21 Let me mention another option, though. According to Cameron (2010), it is possible to maintain that the ordering of
naturalness facts is ontically indeterminate without jeopardising a realist semantics. Cameron develops the view with
respect to vague predicates, but his main idea can be applied to our case as follows: the semantic fact that a given
proposition-naming expression picks out a given entity is determined by use facts plus naturalness facts. While use facts
are ontically  determinate,  naturalness  facts  are  not.  That  is  to say,  the world leaves  it  unsettled whether  a  choice
function is more natural than another.
22 A similar worry might be raised in relation to proposition terms. The considerations that follow are meant to apply
to them as well.
23 See Moltmann (2013) for an extensive defence of this point.
24 See Jeshion (2015).
